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22 December 1961 25X1




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3. USSR-Laos: Pushkin conciliatory on Laos. (*Page ii*)

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6. Syria: Syrian President chooses extreme Arab nationalist to form cabinet. (*Page iv*)

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
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USSR-Laos: [Soviet delegate Pushkin on 20 December told the US representative at the Geneva conference that he felt sure a settlement could be reached on the two outstanding unresolved questions: the Laotian relationship to SEATO, and integration of the Lao armed forces. Pushkin has described as "satisfactory" the West's latest formula--which would require SEATO council representatives to take official note of a Lao declaration of neutrality withdrawing Laos from the protection of any military defensive alliances.]

[Pushkin, who has consistently refused to discuss the question of integration of forces in Laos, also indicated that he would be willing to consider a Western draft on this issue, providing it did not interfere with Laotian internal affairs. The]

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USSR will probably oppose any recommendation for strict ICC control over the integration of Pathet Lao forces and adopt the position that the Geneva conference should merely recognize the right of a new Lao government to supervise this problem

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
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


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
Syria: Syrian President Qudsi's choice of an extreme Arab nationalist, Populist leader Maruf al-Dawalibi, to form a cabinet may be an attempt to secure support for the regime from both rightists and non-Communist leftists. The week's delay in forming a cabinet, as well as the naming of Dawalibi, is indicative of continued factionalism among Syrian political leaders. Dawalibi, who has a long record of cooperation with radical elements, is a leader of the reactionary Moslem Brotherhood. His occasional acceptance of leftist cooperation stems in large part from his extreme anti-Westernism and violent Arab nationalism. Because of his fear and hatred of Israel, as early as 1950 he was a strong advocate of close relations with the USSR and the acquisition of arms and economic assistance from the Soviet bloc. He is bitterly anti-US and was a Soviet guest in Moscow in 1950.

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


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SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

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(Available during the preceding week)



Thailand's security problems and prospects: an analysis
of problems and an estimate of security and foreign policies
for 1962. U.S.I.B. SNIE 52-61. Dec 13'61



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
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West Berlin Morale

Brandt's public statement on 10 December that many people in Berlin anticipated the Christmas season with anxiety or even despair reflected the general feeling of nervousness and uncertainty. He warned against allowing bitterness to give rise to acts of desperation and hopelessness. In order to avoid "misunderstanding" about the sentiments of Berliners, Brandt has again raised the question of a referendum in West Berlin in which Berliners would be asked to decide whether Allied forces should remain in the city and whether the present ties between West Berlin and West Germany should be modified.

Economic indicators of West Berlin morale continued mixed for the second half of November, with private sight deposits and short-term credits up but time deposits and savings deposits down. Bankers are worried over the modest but steady decline in commercial bank deposits, and there are some reported cancellations of industrial orders by West German concerns. Although industrial production for the first ten months of 1961 was over 10 percent above the same period last year, a comparison of production indices for the first half of 1961 with those in the period from July through October shows that the pace of growth is slowing down.

Aware of the growing pessimism in West Berlin, the Communists are planting "scare" stories as part of a war of nerves against inhabitants of the Western sectors. Allied officials have



noted a sudden increase in rumors that the East Germans are planning to "do something"--perhaps at Christmas time. To date, the East Germans have not reacted to the decision of the Social Democratic Bundestag group to meet in West Berlin on 9 January, but they can be expected to protest strongly.

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 Military Representative of the President
 The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 The Scientific Adviser to the President
 The Director of the Budget
 The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
 The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
 The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
 The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
 The Secretary of the Treasury
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 The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense
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 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific
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 The Director, The Joint Staff
 The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
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 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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